This paper investigates a model featuring a monopolist seller and a buyer, with an uncertain valuation for the seller's product. The seller chooses an information system ("IS"), allowing the buyer to receive a private signal, potentially correlated with her valuation. The cost of the IS is proportional to its precision, measured by the mutual information between the distributions of the buyer's valuation and the signal. In general, the probability of a correct signal depends on the buyer's actual valuation, and the probability of trade di ers from the probability of a valuation exceeding the cost of production. Also, the value of the optimal IS is a concave function of its mutual information.
Introduction

Motivation and results
Consumers and rms are often uncertain about the extent to which the products available for purchase can match their preferences, or the requirements of their production processes. Hence, providing information that can reduce such uncertainty is typically the aim of a substantial part of the sellers' marketing activities. Concretely, the sellers may provide detailed descriptions of their products, clarify how the buyers can bene t from them, and/or allow the buyers to physically inspect the products, or to run preliminary tests. This paper investigates a model of such activities where the seller chooses the conditional probability distributions characterizing an information system (or "IS"). The IS allows the buyer to receive a private signal, potentially correlated with her valuation. In the spirit of the literature on "rational inattention" -see [18] -the mutual information ("MI") of the IS is used as a measure of the resources invested by the seller to make the conditional distributions more responsive to the buyer's valuation, and to thereby make more precise information available to the buyer. No restrictions are imposed on the conditional distributions of the signal, and any given value of the MI is generally associated with a continuum of di erent ISs.
The paper establishes two related results:
1. The equilibrium IS is noisy, and generally "non-neutral, " in the sense that (a) the probability of a correct signal di ers across the buyer's possible valuations, and (b) the probability of trade di ers from the probability of a valuation exceeding the cost of production.
Related literature
The model builds on [12] , where the choice of the IS has no direct payo consequences, in the form of a cost, but only indirect consequences, in the form of shifts of the demand curve. In a number of cases investigated thereincluding a unit demand version of the model, which provides the immediate counterpart to the model studied here -the equilibrium IS can be either completely informative, or completely non-informative; this happens respectively if the lowest possible valuation is smaller or greater than the cost of production. Essentially, in the former case -the one on which the present paper focuses -additional information increases the expected surplus potentially generated by the exchange, and ultimately allows the seller to realize a higher pro t, by charging a higher price. In the latter case, a seller who were able to observe the realization of an informative signal provided to the buyer, and to charge a price conditional on it, would face the same expected price and expected pro t as under the default information structure. As the seller does not know the realization of the signal, however, additional information can only reduce the expected pro t.
[16] generalizes this result to cases with more than two buyer types, noting that in general the seller allows the buyer to know, with no errors, whether her valuation is above or below the cost of production. Also in this case, if the lowest willingness to pay is higher than the cost of production, the seller would choose a non-informative IS. The model in [12] also features the non-concavity in the value of information identi ed in [15] . Conversely in the present model -as it was noted in Subsection 1.1 -the value of information is a concave function of quantity. As it is argued in Subsection 3.2 below, the di erent features of the two models depend on the possibility that our seller has to choose di erent ISs, even for a given MI -unlike the seller in [12] . This situation is reminiscent of the statement in [4] , Section 6 , that "the Radner-Stiglitz nonconcavity emerges only by severely constraining the set of information structures available to decision makers. " [19] and [3] consider settings where asymmetric error probabilities allow to better adjust the production of information to the prior beliefs and the payo s of the agents, as in the present paper. In [19] , some information providers transform a continuous signal into a binary signal by using exogenous, heterogeneous thresholds. The providers' reports di er in a (random, but) systematic way, and a decision-maker optimally chooses a provider whose report is relatively likely to con rm her prior beliefs. Such choice is justi ed by the fact that only realizations of the binary signal that both the decision-maker and the provider regard as unlikely, corresponding to extreme realizations of the underlying signal, can possibly induce the decision-maker to change the default decision, and can thereby make the report valuable, ex-ante. In [3] , the information providers may "bias" their reports, by choosing an asymmetric distribution of a given total probability of a correct signal across states; competition between two providers exacerbates the distortions, compared to the monopoly benchmark, essentially by forcing each provider to target a speci c segment of the audience. The main feature of the present paper, in comparison with [3] and [19] , is the use of a criterion rooted in the information-theoretical literature, such as MI, to assign a cost to general ISs. This modeling strategy allows to avoid restrictions that can otherwise be required to reconcile tractability and comparability, but that can be di cult to justify, in general.
On a more general note, the literature on endogenous information provision features two main modeling strategies. In one such strategy, exempli ed by [5] , [9] , [10] , and [14], the sellers face a "coarse" menu of options, relatively to the speci c pieces of information that can be made available to the buyers, and each option generally entails a di erent cost. In the alternative modeling strategy, exempli ed by [1] , [2] , [11] , and [12] , the sellers face a ner menu of options, and there are no cost di erences between the alternative information structures available. An explicit cost assigned to general ISs could facilitate the exploration of the possibilities o ered by intermediate modeling strategies, in perspective.
Plan of the paper
The model is presented in Section 2. The equilibrium and the non-neutrality of the IS are respectively characterized in Section 3 and in Section 4. Section 5 is contains some concluding remarks, and indicates possible topics for future research. All proofs are in the Appendix. The numerical examples on which the gures are based were developed with the help of wxMaxima, which was also used to verify the calculations; the les are available from the Author upon request.
The model
There are a monopolist (producer-)seller of an indivisible product, and a (potential) buyer, who is willing to purchase at most one unit of the product. Both agents are risk-neutral, and maximize their expected payo s. Production can take place upon demand, at the cost c ∈ R ++ . The buyer's type θ is equal to H or to L with respective probabilities q and 1 − q, where q ∈ (0, 1) is given; the valuations v H and v L are real numbers such that max {v L , 0} < c < v H . 1 Imperfect knowledge of the own type (or the product's type) could be due to the buyer's lack of familiarity with the product, which could in turn follow from the novelty of either the product or the situations in which it could be used, from the buyer's point of view. The results of the paper would still hold if we replaced the buyer by a continuum of buyers, with nite size, and endowed the seller with a production technology featuring constant returns to scale, and/or if we traced back the uncertainty about the match-value to the product type, rather than to the buyer type.
As in [12] , the distribution of the buyer type is common knowledge between the buyer and the seller, by default. Additionally, the buyer observes a private signal s ∈ {h, l}, issued by an IS chosen by the seller. Formally, an admissible IS is a pair {a H , a L } ∈ [0, 1] 2 , which de nes the conditional distributions of s. For each buyer type θ ∈ {H, L}, we have:
h, with probability a θ , l, with probability 1 − a θ .
I restrict attention to ISs featuring a H ≥ a L , so that the posterior probability of a type H-buyer is (weakly) greater or smaller than the prior probability q, respectively depending on whether s = h or s = l. 2 This assumption entails no loss of generality; if h and l were systematically swapped, the results of the paper would still hold.
The cost of the IS, borne by the seller, is proportional to the MI between the distributions of the buyer type and the realization of the signal. For notational convenience, given any x ≥ 0, I set
to denote the unconditional probability of s = h. The MI of our "double binary" IS is then
see [6] . 3 The argument of r(x), in (3), is always the probability of some event; r(x) can be interpreted as the product of the same probability and the Shannon information content of the event, − log(x) -see [13] . I (a H , a L ) is the expected "quantity of information" that knowledge of the realization of s provides about the realization of θ, measured in terms of Shannon's entropy -see [17] . 4 The cost of the IS is equal to kI (a H , a L ), where k ∈ R ++ is the given unit cost. Alternatively, we could specify a capacity constraint I ∈ (0, I), as in [18] , and recover k as the "shadow cost" of MI.
ISs featuring a H = a L and a H > a L are respectively labeled trivial and non-trivial. The MI of a trivial IS is equal to 0; at the opposite extreme, the MI of the IS where s is a one-to-one function of θ is equal to
In information theory, MI is generally used as a measure of the capacity of an information channel -both the capacity that would be necessary for the error-free transmission of a set of potential messages, and the actual capacity available. In the present paper, reference to MI can be rationalized by thinking that a larger investment in media exposure and/or sales personnel allows to send a greater number of messages to the buyer. Such investment can reduce the probability of an incorrect classi cation of the type, due to the buyer's limited attention and/or informationprocessing skills. With a continuum of buyers, endowed with heterogeneous heuristics, a broader set of "styles" could also allow a number of buyers representing a larger fraction of the population to interpret the message correctly.
The buyer is assumed to be fully attentive. The qualitative results of the paper are robust to the possibility of wrong responses to the signal observed, as far as the probability of such responses is "not strongly a ected" by the structure of the IS. In the interpretation of the model with a continuum of buyers, a more careful analysis of the informational problem and a greater amount of resources devoted to it could be justi ed, for the seller, by the larger payo at stake. An explicit attention cost borne by the buyer would require the seller to commit to the price, to avoid the no-trade result of [7] : Without commitment, the ex-post optimal price would in fact leave the buyer with a negative net surplus, if she chose to participate in the market. [2] investigate a model in which the seller's marketing strategy determines the cost that the buyers must bear, if they choose to gather information about the product before making their purchase decision. An extension of the present model along similar lines is a potentially interesting topic for future research.
The "double-binary" structure of the communication channel allows to obtain analytical solutions for the endogenous variables. With more than two buyer types, equilibrium and optimal (active) information provision would still be achieved with a binary signal, whose realizations are interpreted as recommendations to purchase the product, or not, as in the multi-type setting with costless information in [16] . As in the present paper, the conditional probability distributions corresponding to the di erent valuations would be non-degenerate, and the probability of a correct signal, for each buyer type, would be an increasing function of the gain from trade.
The equilibrium notion is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium ("PBE") -see [8] . The timing is as follows:
1. The seller chooses and announces the IS {a H , a L }, and the price p ∈ R, and makes a take-it-or-leave-it o er at such price.
2. The buyer observes {a H , a L }, and the realization of the signal s, updates her beliefs about her type, by using Bayes' rule, and decides whether to purchase the product, or not.
The seller has in principle an incentive to mis-represent the IS chosen. In the extreme case, the seller could announce {a H , a L } = {1, 0}, and choose {a H , a L } = {1, 1} instead. To rule out this possibility, I assume that the seller is committed to the IS announced. This could be the case, for example, if the seller relied on an outside information provider, whose reputation would be hampered by any deviations from the stated policy. As the signal is privately observed by the buyer, no commitment problem arises in connection with the price.
As the seller chooses the IS -and not the signal observed by the buyer, directly -the buyer's beliefs are necessarily formed by using Bayes' rule, both on and o the equilibrium path. For any given IS chosen by the seller, I use w s to denote the buyer's willingness to pay conditional on any realization of the signal that has a positive probability, formed in accordance with Bayes' rule:
where A is de ned in (2). It is also convenient to use
to denote the buyer's default expected valuation -which is also the expected valuation conditional on a signal issued by a trivial IS. The buyer's acceptance strategy is a pair {b h , b l } ∈ [0, 1] 2 , where b s , s ∈ {h, l} is the probability of the product being purchased at the price p, if s is observed. In a PBE, the buyer accepts or rejects the seller's o er with probability 1 if the price is respectively above or below her willingness to pay in (5); both strategies can be chosen with a positive probability if equality holds. Formally, if S is any realization of s with a positive probability, the optimal acceptance strategy is characterized by
The seller's expected pro t and the seller's problem are
where b h and b l satisfy (7). By (7), multiple acceptance strategies are only possible if p = w s , either for s = h and/or for s = l. In a PBE, p = w s would in turn require p = W = c -see Lemma 1 below, and the proof of it. With W = c and a trivial IS, multiplicity of {b h , b l } -or the price p ≥ c -is however irrelevant, as both the buyer's and the seller's expected payo s are in any case equal to 0.
De nition 1 An equilibrium is an IS {a * H , a * L } and a price p * , for the seller, and an acceptance strategy {b * h , b * l }, for the buyer, such that:
1. The acceptance strategy satis es (7), given {a * H , a * L } and p * .
2. The IS and the price solve (9).
Asterisks are used to denote the equilibrium values of all endogenous variables.
Equilibrium
Preliminary results
Lemma 1 essentially states that, conditional on the realization of the signal, trade takes place either with probability 1, at a price equal to the buyer's valuation, or with probability 0, depending on whether the valuation is greater or smaller than the cost of production. Furthermore, if the seller chooses a non-trivial IS, the probability of trade depends on the realization of the signal.
Lemma 1
1. Let S denote any realization of the signal observed with a positive probability, in equilibrium.
Considering Lemma 1, we can conveniently set
and
regardless of whether the MI is positive -and therefore (10) and (11) hold by Lemma 1 -or not. In the latter case, our convention is compatible with the belief held by the seller that if she chose {a h , a l } = {a, a}, for some a ∈ (0, 1), then the buyer would respond by setting {b h , b l } = {1, 1} or {b h , b l } = {0, 0}, respectively if c ≤ W or c ≥ W holds, and with optimality, and therefore entails no relevant loss of generality. (10) and (11) allow to rewrite the expected pro t (8) and the seller's problem (9), for operational purposes, as
and as max
The only trivial IS consistent with (10) and (11) is {a h , a l } = {1, 1}, if W > c, and {a h , a l } = {0, 0}, if W < c. With W = c, if a trivial IS could at all be optimal, then any trivial IS could be optimal, together with any price p ≥ c; in Subsection 3.2, it is shown however that in this case a trivial IS is never chosen, in equilibrium.
Remark 1 In the unit demand setting of the paper, the seller's problem (13) coincides with the problem faced by a hypothetical planner, maximizing the total surplus generated by the exchanges. (12) , is a concave function of the probability pair characterizing the IS -and a strictly concave function, if we consider non-trivial ISs.
Lemma 2 states that
Lemma 2 allows to conclude that non-unique solutions to (13) would necessarily feature trivial ISs. The rst order conditions for (13) -obtained by setting (A.4) and (A.5), in part A.3 of the Appendix, equal to 0 -are both necessary and su cient for a solution featuring a non-trivial IS. To formalize this statement, we must confront the fact that as r(x), de ned in (1), is not di erentiable at x = 0, the rst order conditions for the problem in (13) A corollary of Lemma 3 is that the optimal IS necessarily issues incorrect signals with a positive probability. Building on Lemma 3, Lemma 4 concludes that any non-trivial (and necessarily interior) IS that is a local solution to the seller's problem (13) is indeed "the" solution to (13) .
Lemma 4 Any local solution to (13) featuring a H > a L is a unique, global solution.
Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 justify the strategy used below, in part 1 of Theorem 1, to establish existence of an equilibrium: We prioritize the search for interior values of {a H , a L } that solve (13), and consider possible boundary solutions -which can be located either at {0, 0}, or at {1, 1} -only if no such values exist.
The characterization of the equilibrium relies on the following values of q:
A buyer who believes to be of type H with probability q χ would be indi erent between purchasing the product at p = c, or not.
Lemma 5 states that q, q χ , and q do qualify as probabilities, and provides information about their relative positions.
Lemma 5 q and q are respectively strictly increasing and strictly decreasing in k, with lim k→0 q = 0, lim k→0 q = 1, and lim k→∞ q = lim k→∞ q = q χ .
Existence and comparative statics
Toward stating the results on existence and comparative statics, in Theorem 1, let us de ne
Theorem 1 1. The equilibrium IS is:
2. If q ∈ q, q , a H and a L are both increasing in q, v H , and v L , and decreasing in c. Furthermore, we have lim k→0 a H = 1, lim k→0 a L = 0 and
Thus, equilibrium is identi ed by (10), (11), and (20). If q is above q or below q, trade occurs with respective probabilities 1 and 0. If q ∈ q, q , the buyer's decision depends on the signal issued by a non-trivial IS, and the probability of trade increases monotonically with q. Interestingly, in the latter case, q and q coincide with the posterior probabilities of a buyer type equal to H, respectively formed upon observation of s = h and s = l, as it is readily veri ed.
As we know from Lemma 5, q χ is asymptotically "sandwiched" between q and q, with the latter variables monotonically converging toward it from the values of 0 and 1, as k becomes arbitrarily large. In line with the general principles, the information provided by the IS is very valuable if q is close to q χ , namely if the gross (and the seller's) expected surplus that would be generated (or destroyed) by an exchange, with a trivial IS, is relatively close to the no-trade value of 0. As it was mentioned after the de nition of the relevant part of the buyer's acceptance strategy in (7), in Subsection 3.1, the case of W = c (and q = q χ ) would be the only one potentially consistent with multiple, reciprocally consistent best responses, with a trivial IS. However, if q = q χ , the seller chooses a non-trivial IS for any value of k, and equilibrium is therefore unique for every admissible parametrization of the model -up to a permutation of h and l.
In Figure 1 , the results in part 1 of Theorem 1 are illustrated by a plot of the MI of the equilibrium IS for di erent values of k and q; the values of the remaining parameters are c = 5 9 , v H = 1, and v L = 0. Essentially, as k increases, the interval of the values of q associated with a non-trivial IS becomes more and more narrow, and the MI of the optimal IS, within the interval, decreases. Concerning the comparative statics results in Part 2 of Theorem 1, notice that increases in q, v H , and v L increase the relative size of the expected loss due to an unexploited surplus-creating exchange, if the buyer is of type H, compared to that of a loss due to a surplus-destroying exchange completed, if the buyer is of type L, while increases in c have the opposite e ect. Thus, in each case, changes in α H and α L re ect the opportunity to reduce the (relative) probability of the error which becomes relatively more costly. Furthermore, if k is small, α H and α L are close to 1 and to 0, respectively, while if k is large, both α H and α L are close to 1, or to 0, depending on whether c < W or c > W holds. As it turns out, the variable which has the same value both if k is small and if k is large rst moves away from such value, and then moves back toward it, as k increases, while the other variable features a monotonic transition between the two limiting values. This is illustrated in part (a) of 
, is equal to a given constant. Each dark-gray curve is the locus of the ISs whose information cost, kI (a H , a L ), is equal to a given constant. The light-gray line is the "expansion path, " parametrized by di erent values of k in R ++ ; notice that {a H , a L } = {1, 0} is never an optimal IS, as we know from Lemma 3, and that {a H , a L } = {0, 0} is the optimal IS for all values of k above a given threshold. 
Remark 2
The results in part 1 of Theorem 1, together with continuity of I (a H , a L ), allow to conclude that any value of the MI in [0, I), for I de ned in (4), can be associated with an optimal IS, for a suitable value of k.
Thus, the present model does not share the non-concavity in the value of information featured by the model in [12] , and generally characterized in [15] . Concavity of the value of information re ects the convexity of the seller's strategy space, which makes it possible to choose non-trivial ISs arbitrarily close to the potentially optimal, trivial ISs. Convexity of the seller's strategy space would be lost, for example, if the seller could only choose an IS featuring symmetric error probabilities, namely a H = 1 − a L , except in the special case of c = W . The situation is illustrated in part (b) of Figure 2 , where the light-gray segment represents the whole set of the ISs that would allow the seller to improve her gross expected pro t -rather than the actual expansion path, as in part (a). Even the former set is at a positive distance from the set of the trivial ISs, and in particular from the optimal trivial IS. Hence, each IS belonging to it necessarily features a strictly positive cost, and ISs in the upper part of the segment can also be ruled out, as the values of qa H (v H − c) + (1 − q)a L (v L − c) corresponding to them, albeit positive, would be too small to cover their cost. Thus, values of I between 0 and some ι ∈ (0, I) cannot possibly be associated with an equilibrium.
Non-neutrality
In the absence of an established convention, I identify a neutral IS, alternatively, with:
1. An IS such that the conditional probability of a correct signal is identical across buyer types, namely that
2. An IS such that the unconditional probability with which each signal is sent coincides with the probability of the buyer type ideally associated with the signal, namely that
The requirement in (21) is equivalent to that in De nition 1 in [3] . To justify (22), notice that Lemma 7, (11), and part 1 of Theorem 1 allow to conclude that A * -the equilibrium value of the unconditional probability of s = h, de ned in (2) -coincides the ex-ante probability of trade.
If we impose symmetric error probabilities, and set a σ = a * H = 1 − a * L , the sign of
coincides with the sign of 1 − 2q. Thus, with a noisy IS satisfying (21), the signal ideally associated with the more likely buyer type is sent with an unconditional probability that is lower than the probability of the buyer type, and (22) is necessarily violated, except if q = 1 2 . Toward stating the result of the present Section, in Theorem 2, let
and Values of c and q on the border between the white and the gray area correspond to ISs such that the probability of trade is equal to the probability of a high-valuation match, i.e. (22) holds; A * > q and A * < q respectively hold in the gray and in the white region.
2. q iso , de ned in (24), is the unique value of q such that (22) holds. q ≶ q iso respectively implies A * ≶ q.
respectively implies q iso ≶ q sym .
The results in Theorem 2 are illustrated in Figure 3 , where the pairs {c, q} ∈ (v L , v H ) × (0, 1) are classi ed taking (21) and (22) . Additional numerical investigations, available upon request, reveal that this tendency becomes more evident as k decreases; decreases in k are also typically accompanied by smaller gaps between A * and q, in either direction. Essentially, lower values of k are optimally exploited by choosing conditional distributions of the signal that are "farther and farther apart" between them. The changes in the relative sizes of the intervals re ect adjustments to the unconditional probabilities of the signals that reduce the cost consequences of the increased precision.
Concluding remarks
I have investigated the information provision problem of a monopolist, who faces a buyer with an uncertain valuation for her product. The monopolist chooses an IS, which sends a private signal to the buyer; the cost of the IS is proportional to the MI between the distributions of the signal and the buyer's valuation. The equilibrium IS is noisy; in general, the probability of a correct signal di ers across buyer types, and the probability of trade di ers from the probability of the buyer type which makes the exchange surplus-creating. Thus, bias can be a feature of optimal information provision, even if deception is ruled out. A further, related result is that the value of information is a concave function of the MI.
Non-neutrality re ects the idea that the agents can be expected to be relatively more careful to avoid errors that are more costly. From this point of view, the paper is related to a number of papers focusing on non-neutral, optimal ISssuch as [3] and [19] . The reference to MI allows to assign a cost to general ISs, and to thereby avoid restrictions which may otherwise be necessary, for the sake of tractability and/or of comparability, such as the assumption of symmetric error probabilities. The related possibility to avoid the [15] non-concavity problem is an additional advantage of this approach, also in view of possible future research on endogenous information structures.
The paper has focused on the case of a monopolist seller. In this case, the incentive for the seller to provide information arises from the possibility to appropriate of the additional surplus created. With multiple sellers, the same incentive may result from the greater degree of product di erentiation perceived by the buyers, as in [5] , [9] , [10] , and [14] . The relevance of the e ects studied in the present paper, in the latter scenario, is a potentially interesting topic for future research. Further topics of potential interest are the performance of di erent exchange mechanisms, if the precision of the ISs can be made conditional on the match value, and the analysis of the interactions between the di erent parts of an information channel, if each part is subject to speci c costs and/or constraints, and is managed by a distinct economic subject. 
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
The seller's expected pro t gross of the information cost, qa
is an a ne function of {a H , a L }. Hence, establishing the claim is equivalent to establishing convexity of kI (a H , a L ), and therefore of I (a H , a L ), which is in turn established for general, discrete communication channels in the second part of Theorem 2.7.4 in [6] . The present proof is a version of the proof provided there, adjusted to the notation used in the present paper, and emphasizing the fact that strict convexity holds if at least one of the ISs being combined is non-trivial -see (14). Let us consider two distinct ISs {a H , a L } and {a H , a L }, and the IS a λ H , a λ L de ned in the claim, for any given λ ∈ (0, 1). Let J , J , and J λ denote the corresponding joint distributions of the buyer's type θ and the signal s, whose support and whose general formula are Ω = {{H, h}, {H, l}, {L, h}, {L, l}},
Also, let J , J and J λ denote the joint distributions corresponding to the hypothetical case in which θ and s were independently distributed, whose general formula is obtained from (A.1) by replacing both a H and a L by A, de ned in (2) , and let J ω and J ω , where ω ∈ Ω, denote the generic element of J and J.
For the generic IS {a H , a L }, I (a H , a L ) is equal to the Kullback-Leibler distance D J J between the joint distributions J and J:
For any ω ∈ Ω, the Log-sum inequality allows to write
see Theorem 2.7.1 in [6] . By summing over Ω, we can then conclude that λ ∈ (0, 1) implies
namely convexity of D J J and of I (a H , a L ). As equality in (A.2) requires
imply both strict inequality in (A.3), and therefore strict convexity of D J J and of I (a H , a L ).
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
As we focus on the cases in which a H ≥ a L , we must rule out optimality of the ISs featuring either a H = 1 and a L ∈ (0, 1), or a H ∈ (0, 1) and a L = 0. In all such cases, changes in the value of the variable on the boundary lead to a decrease both in the pro t gross of the cost of MI, and in the MI, which have opposite e ects on Π (a H , a L ). The partial derivatives 5) are not de ned on the boundary if a H ∈ {0, 1} and if a L ∈ {0, 1}, respectively. However, as Π (a H , a L ) is continuous over [0, 1] 2 , and
the Mean Value Theorem can be invoked to conclude that both
can be made positive by choosing values of a H and a L suitably close to 1 and to 0, and to thereby establish the result.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 4
Let {a H , a L } be a solution to (13) 
As λ can be arbitrarily close to 1, Π (a H , a L ) < Π a λ H , a λ L would however be inconsistent with the assumption that {a H , a L } is a local solution to (13) . Hence, {a H , a L } is necessarily a unique solution to (13) .
A.5 Proof of Lemma 5
It is readily veri ed that the signs of the derivatives ∂q ∂k and ∂q ∂k respectively coincide with the signs of
and are therefore both equal to 0 if c = v H and if c = v L . Furthermore, convexity of the exponential function implies
As both
hold at a unique (generally distinct) value of c, necessarily falling in the interval (v L , v H ), By using (2), we can rearrange the rst order conditions for an interior solution to (12) , obtained by setting the derivatives in (A.4) and in (A.5) equal to 0, to obtain
(2) can then be rewritten as
The RHS of (A.8) is certainly de ned for any A ∈ (0, 1). In general, (A.8) is solved by A = 1 and by A = A, where
α H and α L in (18) and (19), obtained by setting A = A in (A.6) and (A.7), and A take values in the interval (0, 1) -and are therefore compatible with an interior solution to (13) , if q ∈ q, q -for q and q de ned in (15) and (17). In this case, Lemma 4 allows to conclude that the values of the respective variables are the unique solution to (13) , and identify the unique equilibrium of the model. Notice that q = q χ ∈ q, q certainly holds, by Lemma 5, if c = W , for W de ned in (6) . If, on the other hand, q / ∈ q, q , then the rst order conditions for an interior solution to (13) cannot be satis ed. Considering Lemma 3, the only possibilities left are then {a * H , a * L } = {1, 1} and {a * H , a * L } = {0, 0}, which are both associated with w * = W . The former or the latter IS is then the solution to (13), depending on whether c < W or c > W holds.
A.6.2 Part 2
It is readily veri ed that if q ∈ q, q , we have: The RHS of (A.9) admits no nite limit if c ↓
. Furthermore, inspection of (A.9) immediately reveals that q < 0 holds for c ∈ v L ,
. This fact, together with the symmetry relation −q | c= , v H .
Hence, q / ∈ (0, 1) holds for any admissible value of c, and q is irrelevant, given our present purposes. On the other hand, q sym is always a relevant solution of (21). Given 
A.7.2 Part 2
Direct calculation reveals that q iso in (24) is the unique value of q that solves (22), given the values of the remaining parameters. To characterize the regions de ned by q iso , notice that q iso | c=v L = 0, q iso | c=v H = 1, and v L < c < v H guarantee . The claim is then readily established by using (A.10), in the proof of Part 1, to identify the sub-intervals of (0, 1) that must include q iso , in the two cases.
